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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vi. : Case No. 200603 54-CA 
AARON MERWORTH, 
Defendant/ Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (2002). See Addendum A (Judgment and Conviction). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE: Did the trial court err in denying Merworth's motion to suppress all 
evidence resulting from his detention and arrest, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution? 
Standard of Review: This court reviews "the factual findings 
underlying the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence using 
a clearly erroneous standard." State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62^8, 6 P.3d 1133 (quotations 
and citations omitted). This court reviews "conclusions of law based on these findings 
for correctness." Id. "We abandon the standard which extended 'some deference' to the 
application of law to the underlying factual findings in search and seizure cases in favor 
of non-deferential review." State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95,^15, 103 P.3d 699. 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant Merworth's challenge to the constitutionality of his detention, search, 
and seizure is preserved on the record for appeal ("R.") at 30-32 and 65:2. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is determinative of the 
issue on appeal. It provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Merworth was charged by Information with one count of Illegal Possession/Use of 
Controlled Substance, a Class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code section 58-37-
8(2AI) (2005); one count of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, 
in violation of Utah Code section 58-37A-5(l) (2005); and one count of 
Purchase/Possession of Tobacco by Minor, a Class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code section 76-10-105 (2005). R. at 1-3. 
Merworth moved to suppress evidence that was seized during his detention and 
search of his person. R. at 16. He filed a written motion to suppress. R. at 17-20. The 
2 
State did not file a response. An evidentiary hearing on the motion was held. R. at 25 
and 64. The trial court denied Merworth's motion. R. at 25 and 64:28. It did not provide 
written factual findings and conclusions of law. 
Merworth entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). R. at 30-32 and 65:2. Merworth pleaded guilty to all charges. R. 
at 65:2, 4-5. Merworth was sentenced to a suspended jail term and probation. R. at 38-
40.* A timely notice of appeal was filed. R. at 47-48. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The following evidence was testified to at the suppression hearing: 
On September 25, 2005, Officer Olsen and Officer Flores saw Merworth walking 
with four other young males in the vicinity of Liberty Park in Salt Lake City. R. at 64:4-
5. The officers watched the males approach an intersection by Liberty Park. R. at 64:6. 
Once at the intersection, Merworth and another individual, Robert, left the three other 
males and continued to a house just down the street. R. at 64:6. The three other males 
sat on the curb. Id. The officers approached the males on the curb and asked them what 
they were doing. Id. They said they were waiting while a friend used the bathroom. Id 
Robert and Merworth exited the house. R. at 64:7. 
Merworth looked over at the group of young men and officers; he looked startled. 
Id. As soon as Officer Olsen saw Merworth, he asked if he could speak with him. Id. 
1 Merworth later filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence. R. at 57-58 and 63. That 
motion was granted by the trial court, thereby amending the sentence, judgment, and 
commitment to reflect an accurate and legal sentence. R. at 63. 
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Officer Olsen said, "Can I talk to you for a minute?" Id. Merworth said, "Sure." R. at 
64:8. Merworth spoke to Officer Olsen; Robert approached Officer Flores. R. at 64:13. 
Officer Flores spoke to Robert approximately six to seven feet away from where Officer 
Olsen spoke to Merworth. R. at 64:9 Officer Olsen asked Merworth what he was doing. 
R. at 64:8. Merworth responded that he had just come from his house. Id. Officer Olsen 
told Merworth that Merworth5s friends said that Merworth had gone to the house to get 
them drugs. Id Merworth looked at his friends and said, "I wasn't doing that." R. at 
64:14. Officer Olsen then said, "They told me that they gave you money and you were 
supposed to bring them back some drugs." Id. Merworth shrugged his shoulders. 
Officer Olsen asked Merworth whether he had any drugs on him; Merworth said, "Just 
some marijuana." Id 
During the interaction with Merworth, Officer Olsen never told Merworth that he 
could leave. R. at 64:14-15. The three young men never said anything incriminating 
about Merworth and Robert. R. at 64:13. Officer Olsen lied to Merworth about what 
Merworth's friends had told Officer Olsen with regard to Merworth getting drugs. R. at 
64:14-15. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Merworth's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when Officer Olsen engaged 
him in a level two detention unsupported by a reasonable articulable suspicion to believe 
Merworth was engaged in criminal activity. See State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987). 
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"The distinction between a level-one encounter (a purely consensual encounter) 
and a level-two encounter (a seizure requiring reasonable suspicion) depends on whether, 
through a show of physical force or authority, a person believes his freedom of 
movement is restrained." State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
The encounter between Merworth and police constituted a level two detention. 
This court has recognized factors that, when considered in light of all other 
circumstances, tend to show that a seizure has occurred: 
1) threatening presence of several officers; 
2) the display of a weapon by an officer; 
3) physical touching of the person of the citizen, 
4) use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance might be 
compelled. 
See State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
The United States Supreme Court, in addition to citing factors one through four, 
explained that "[i]n the absence of some such evidence, otherwise inoffensive contact 
between a member of the public and the police cannot. . . amount to a seizure of that 
person." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (1980) 
(emphasis added). Thus, "an encounter becomes a seizure if the officer engages in 
conduct which a reasonable man would view as threatening or offensive even if 
performed by another private citizen." 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 9.4(a), 
at 427 (4th ed. 2004) (emphasis added). 
Officer Olsen engaged in threatening and offensive conduct when he accused 
Merworth of being a drug distributor. Additionally, Officer Olsen's statements would 
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cause a reasonable person to believe that "his freedom of movement [was] restrained." 
Struhs, 940 P.2d at 1227. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MERWORTH'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS. 
The trial court erred in failing to suppress evidence seized in violation of 
Merworth's Fourth Amendment right against warrantless search and seizure. See U.S. 
Const, amend. IV. Merworth has standing to challenge the search and seizure since he 
was the individual detained and searched. 
This court reviews "the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision to 
grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence using a clearly erroneous standard." State v. 
Veteto, 2000 UT 62^8, 6 P.3d 1133 (quotations and citations omitted). The trial court 
did not make written findings of fact and conclusions of law. However, there are no 
meaningful disputes about the facts in this case. 
After hearing argument from both sides, the trial court made the following 
conclusions: 
You've only got two cops. You've got five men. 
Everything's consensual. I think a reasonable person would 
have felt free to leave right up until Mr. Merworth 
incriminated himself. Your motion's denied. 
R. at 64:28 (attached hereto as Addendum B). This court reviews "conclusions of law 
based on these findings for correctness." Veteto, 2000 UT 62 at ^8. Additionally, this 
court no longer extends "'some deference' to the application of law to the underlying 
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factual findings in search and seizure cases in favor of non-deferential review." State v. 
Brake, 2004 UT 95,^15, 103 P.3d 699. 
Therefore, this court reviews the trial court's order denying Merworth's motion to 
suppress for correctness, and does not give deference to the trial court's application of 
law to the facts. 
In State v. Alverez, 2005 UT App 145, 111 P.3d 808, this court encountered facts 
nearly identical to the facts in this appeal. However, this court declined to "express an 
opinion about whether Defendant's encounter with [officers] actually was a level two 
encounter constituting a seizure under the Fourth Amendment," id. at <fll0, n.2, because 
the outcome of Defendant's appeal would have been the same regardless of how that 
issue was decided. See id. 
A. Merworth's encounter with Officer Olsen involved a level two detention 
Merworth's motion to suppress should have been granted because his Fourth 
Amendment rights were violated when Officer Olsen engaged him in a level two 
detention unsupported by a reasonable articulable suspicion to believe Merworth was 
engaged in criminal activity. See State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
2 "As Defendant came around the full-size van, [two officers], who were both in 
uniform, approached Defendant cto talk with him.' [One officer] first asked if Defendant 
knew that the vehicle was uninsured. According to [the officer], Defendant's response 
was, cHow[ did] you know that?' [The officer] then explained to Defendant that the 
vehicle had been suspected of being involved in some drug transactions. According to 
[the officer], Defendant denied having any knowledge of this information. [The officer] 
continued by asking Defendant if he had any drugs on his person, and Defendant 
responded that he did not." State v. Alverez, 2005 UT App 145,^5, 111 P.3d 808. 
7 
In State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court 
recognized "three levels of police encounters with the public": 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and 
pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained against 
his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an 
"articulable suspicion55 that the person has committed or is 
about to commit a crime; however, the "detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate 
the purpose of the stop55; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if 
the officer has probable cause to believe an offense has been 
committed or is being committed. 
IdL at 617-18 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
The issue in this appeal is whether Merworth5s interaction with Officer Olsen falls 
within the first or the second category. At the hearing on Merworth5s motion to suppress, 
both the parties and the court seemed to agree that the issue was whether Merworth was 
detained/seized, R. at 64:15, rather than whether reasonable suspicion existed to support a 
seizure. 
"The distinction between a level-one encounter (a purely consensual encounter) 
and a level-two encounter (a seizure requiring reasonable suspicion) depends on whether, 
through a show of physical force or authority, a person believes his freedom of 
movement is restrained.55 State v. Struhs. 940 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
(citation omitted); see also State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
"Important to the determination is whether defendant remained, not in the spirit of 
cooperation with the officer's investigation, but because he believed he [was] not free to 
leave.55 Struhs, 940 P.2d at 1227; Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 87; State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 
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986 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
This test "is objective and depends on when the person reasonably feels detained, 
not on when the police officer thinks the person is no longer free to leave." State v. 
Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 
786 (Utah 1991) (quotations and citation omitted); State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).3 
This court has recognized factors that, when considered in light of all other 
circumstances, tend to show that a seizure has occurred: 
1) threatening presence of several officers; 
2) the display of a weapon by an officer; 
3) physical touching of the person of the citizen, 
4) use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance might be 
compelled. 
Bean, 869 P.2d at 986 (citing Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 87); see also United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (1980). 
1. Threatening Presence of Several Officers 
As to the first factor, the trial court correctly noted that, "You've only got two 
cops. You've got five men." R. at 64:28. While there were only two officers, Robert 
and Merworth were separated from the rest of the group and from each other. 
Additionally, Officer Olsen alienated Merworth from his friends—the "five men"—by 
3 Succinct language describing the difference between a consensual encounter and a 
seizure comes from an unpublished opinion—Salt Lake City v. Archibald, 2001 UT App 
375, 2001 WL 1549133. In Archibald, this court described a consensual (level one) 
encounter as one where a person feels free to disregard/ignore the police. 
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telling Merworth that his friends had just incriminated him. 
2. Display of a Weapon by an Officer 
While Officers Olsen and Flores did not brandish their firearms or direct their 
weapons at Merworth, the officers were in uniform, on duty, and wearing their weapons. 
3. Physical Touching of the Person of the Citizen 
There is no indication in the record that Merworth was ever touched by either 
officer. 
4. Use of Language or Tone of Voice Indicating that Compliance 
Might be Compelled. 
Officer Olsen did not testify that he used a harsh or demanding tone when he 
asked Merworth to speak to him. R. at 64:7-8. However, Merworth does not claim that 
he was the subject of a level two detention from the very inception of his encounter with 
Officer Olsen, and there was no testimony about the tone of voice he used with Merworth 
as the conversation progressed. It is difficult to contemplate Officer Olsen's accusations 
being conveyed in a non-compelling manner. The real meaning of Officer Olsen's 
language and the substance of his message was that Officer Olsen knew Merworth was 
guilty of drug-dealing. Certainly, compliance might be compelled when an officer knows 
an individual is guilty of a crime. 
5. All Other Circumstances Including Offensive Contact 
The United States Supreme Court, in addition to citing factors one through four, 
went on to explain that "[i]n the absence of some such evidence, otherwise inoffensive 
10 
contact between a member of the public and the police cannot. . . amount to a seizure of 
that person." Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555 (emphasis added). 
Several federal appellate courts have explained that the social and civil instinct to 
cooperate with law enforcement is insufficient to elevate an encounter between police 
and the citizenry to a level two detention. United States v. Simmons, 918 F.2d 476 (5th 
Cir. 1990) ("one's self-identification as a law enforcement officer is not so coercive that 
this statement alone renders an encounter between citizen and police a seizure"); United 
States v. Maragh, 894 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (a consensual encounter does not 
become an investigative stop at the moment an officer identifies him/herself as a 
narcotics officer); United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 774 F.2d 1036 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(identifying oneself as an INS agent does not transform an encounter into a seizure). 
Tennessee has also ruled that an "encounter did not become a seizure simply because 
[Defendant] may have felt inherent social pressure to cooperate." State v. Daniel 12 
S.W.3d 420, 427 (Tenn. 2000). 
"On the other hand, an encounter becomes a seizure if the officer engages in 
conduct which a reasonable man would view as threatening or offensive even if 
performed by another private citizen." 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 9.4(a), 
at 427 (4th ed. 2004) (emphasis added). LaFave explains that "'[offensive statements,'" 
such as 'unsupported outright accusations of criminal activity'" are relevant in 
determining whether an individual was subjected to a seizure. Id, at 431; see also State 
v. Quino, 840 P.2d 358, 363 (Haw. 1992) (finding a seizure where an officer approached 
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Defendant by starting an "apparently innocuous 'voluntary conversation"'. . . which 
"soon evolved into an interrogation as . . . [the] questions grew more intrusive and 
accusatory in nature.") 
Although this court has said that "a seizure within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment does not occur when a police officer merely approaches an individual on the 
street and questions him, if the person is willing to listen," Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 87-88 
(citation omitted); see also State v. Bean, 869 P.2d at 986, this is not a typical case of 
police questioning. In fact, this is not a case about questioning at all. Had Officer Olsen 
pursued a line of questioning about any number of things, or if Officer Olsen had asked 
whether Merworth had any drugs on him, then that interaction could be considered a 
consensual level one encounter. However, in this case, Officer Olsen chose to forego the 
questions, and turn immediately to accusations. In State v. Smith, 2006 UT App 69, 2006 
WL 445943, this court, in an unpublished opinion, briefly addressed the difference 
between investigatory questioning and accusatory questioning. In Smith, the defendant 
argued that she had been involved in a level three detention requiring Miranda4 warnings. 
Defendant argued that although the officer's questioning had been brief, it had been 
accusatory rather than investigatory. It was the accusatory questioning, defendant 
argued, that escalated the encounter not just to a level two detention, but to a level three 
seizure. This court determined that the officer's questioning had not been accusatory, 
and thus, it did not rise to the level of a level three formal arrest requiring Miranda 
4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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warnings. In this case, Merworth addresses only a level two seizure, and Officer Olsen 
admitted to accusing Merworth of specific criminal conduct. R. at 64:8, 14. 
"An accused must be apprised [sic] of his Miranda rights if the setting is custodial 
or accusatory rather than investigatory. In other words, at the point the environment 
becomes custodial or accusatory, a police officer's questions must be prefaced with a 
Miranda warning." Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1170 (Utah 1983). In this 
instance, Merworth does not argue that Officer Olsen was required to give him Miranda 
warnings because he was the subject of a level three seizure; Merworth simply maintains 
that the accusatory nature of Olsen's statements made him the subject of a level two 
detention. 
This was a situation where Officer Olsen chose to lie, a tactic he uses "in some 
investigations." R. at 64:14. This appeal is not about the propriety of telling lies in 
police investigations. On the other hand, it seems likely that in most, if not all, situations 
where an officer chooses to use an unsupported accusation, i.e. a lie, in an attempt to get 
a citizen to confess, the lie (the accusation) used by the officer will be offensive, if only 
because it is blameworthy and culpable. In this case, the lies—namely, that Merworth 
had gone to the house to get drugs for his friends, and that Merworth's friends told 
Officer Olsen "they gave you money and you were supposed to bring them back some 
drugs"—were inculpatory, accusatory, and offensive. These were not questions; they 
were statements of specific criminal conduct. Officer Olsen told Merworth that 
Merworth's friends had just provided information that Merworth was engaged in criminal 
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conduct rising to the level of a felony—drug distribution. 
In addition to these accusations falling directly into the category of offensive 
contact mentioned by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Mendenhall, 
446 U.S. 544, 555, these are also statements that would make a reasonable person believe 
he/she was not free to leave. It does not make any sense for a reasonable person, at the 
same time that person is being accused of drug-dealing activities by the police, to feel 
free to ignore the officer and disregard the officer's statements. Cf. State v. Chism, 2005 
UT App 4l,1fl 1, 107 P.3d 706 (citing State v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn. 
1995), where, in the context of alcohol consumption, a police officer's request for age 
identification is more than a simple inquiry into identity and constitutes a seizure.) 
In State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), u[t]he officers exited their 
vehicle, identified themselves as police officers, and questioned defendant about his 
identity and his behavior." Id at 539. The court determined that "defendant was seized 
from the very inception of his contact with the police officers." Id at 540. The facts in 
this case go one step further. After Officer Olsen asked Merworth what he had been 
doing, he displayed a show of authority by use of accusations making Merworth, or any 
reasonable person, believe that "his freedom of movement [was] restrained." State v. 
Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
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B. Merworth's detention was not supported by an articulable reasonable 
suspicion. 
A level two seizure is allowed only when "'specific and articulable facts and 
rational inferences . . . give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person has or is committing a 
crime.'" State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125,1)37, 63 P.3d 650 (other citation omitted). "This 
is true even if the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention brief." Salt 
Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55,^11, 998 P.2d 274 (quotations and citations omitted). 
Merworth's rights against illegal search and seizure as guaranteed by the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution were violated when Officer Olsen detained 
him without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968); State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157 (Utah 1997); State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446 
(Utah 1996); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994); see also, Utah Code Ann. 77-7-
15 (2003) (codifying the constitutionally mandated standard for investigative stops). 
The issue of whether reasonable suspicion existed was not determined by 
the trial court because it found that no level two seizure existed. R. at 64:28. The State 
did not point to any facts adduced during the hearing on Merworth's motion to suppress 
that would indicate the existence of reasonable suspicion. When evidence obtained by a 
warrantless search or seizure are the subject of a motion to suppress, the State has the 
burden of demonstrating the constitutionality of the search or seizure. See State v. Wells, 
928 P.2d 386, 389 (Utah App. 1996), affd, 939 P.2d 1204 (Utah 1997); State v. Brown, 
853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992); United States v. Maestas, 2 F.3d 1485, 1491 (10th Cir. 
15 
1993). It is the State's burden to present evidence sufficient to demonstrate, in the case 
of a level two detention, that reasonable suspicion existed. 
The State did not argue below that these facts amounted to reasonable suspicion, 
and reasonable suspicion cannot be used as an alternative basis for affirmance under the 
circumstances of this case. Officer Olsen testified to the following: 
1) A group of young men were walking out of Liberty Park. R. at 64:4-5. 
2) At an intersection near the park, Merworth and Robert separated from the 
other three young men and continued on to a house; the other three sat on the 
curb. R. at 64:6. 
3) The three young men told the officers that they were taking turns using the 
bathroom. R. at 64:6. 
4) The officers asked the three young men why they were going to use the 
bathroom at the house, rather than Liberty Park. R. at 64:6. Officer Olsen did 
not testify as to their response to this question. 
5) A couple of minutes later, Merworth and Robert exited the house and 
returned to the other three. R. at 64:6-7. 
6) Merworth looked over at the officers talking to the other three, and "he 
looked a little bit startled." R. at 64:7. 
In order to justify a seizure, the officer "must point to specific articulable facts 
which, together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a reasonable 
person to conclude [defendant] had committed or was about to commit a crime." State v. 
16 
Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Nothing about these facts suggests that 
Merworth was involved in a crime, let alone amount to reasonable suspicion.5 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Merworth respectfully requests this court to reverse the 
trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this $ day of July, 2006. 
JHARLA M. DUNRC 
/Attorney for Defendant/Appeallant 
5 Cf. State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 466-67 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (finding no reasonable 
suspicion under the following facts: officers noticed defendant in airport, scanning the 
area, but not appearing to be looking for anyone in particular or reading signs for 
directions; as defendant walked along the concourse, "he looked back in the direction of 
the officers three times"; defendant then used a pay telephone for a short time; he walked 
to the escalator and quickened his pace, passing other people; defendant exited the airport 
terminal, maintaining his fast pace, and was about to get into a taxi when he was stopped 
by an officer; when asked for identification, defendant said he did not have any, but 
began to look in his bag for identification; while bending over to look in his bag, an 
officer noticed a line protruding through defendant's shirt.). 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
/9//)&j£>eO 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
AARON MERWORTH, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 051906869 MO 
Judge: STEPHEN L HENRIOD 
Date: April 10, 2006 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lynm 
Prosecutor: BROWN, TIFFANY M 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s) : DUNROE, SHARLA M 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: October 31, 1986 
Audio 
Tape Number: 34 Tape Count: 1017 
CHARGES 
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 02/13/2006 Guilty 
2 . POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA -
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 
3. PURCHASE/POSSESSION OF TOBACCO BY 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 
SENTENCE JAIL 
- Class A Misdemeanor 
: 02/13/2006 Guilty 
MINOR - Class C Misdemeanor 
: 02/13/2006 Guilty 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) The total time suspended for 
this charge is 362 day(s). 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OF DRUG 
PARAPHERNALIA a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to 
a term of 365 day(s) The total time suspended for this charge is 
365 day(s). 
Based on the defendant's conviction of PURCHASE/POSSESSION OF 
TOBACCO BY MINOR a Class C Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced 
Case No: 051906869 
Date Apr 10, 2006 
to a term 
9 0 day(s) 
of 90 day(s) The total time suspended for this charge is 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $2500.00 
Suspended: $2500.00 
Charge # 2 
Charge # 3 
Total Fine 
Total Suspended 
Total Surcharge 
Total Principal Due 
$2500.00 
$2500.00 
$0 
$0 
Plus Interest 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 24 month (s) . 
Probation is to be supervised by Salt Lake Co Probation Service, 
Defendant to serve 3 day(s) jail. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
Violate no laws. 
Submit to drug testing. 
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise 
distributed illegally. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
Defendant is to complete 100 hours community service thru probation 
at the rate of 10 hours a month. 
Defendant is to have a substance abuse evaluation and complete any 
treatment recommended by probation. 
Defendant is to maintain full time verifiable employment approved 
by probation. 
Defendant: is to obtain nis high school diploma. 
Pacre 2 
Case No: 051906869 
Date: Apr 10, 2006 
Defendant is to pay $250 child support to the mother of his child 
and maintain proof of that payment. 
Dated this ^j day of h \ ^ 
STEPHEN L HENRIOD 
District Court, Judge 
BS?AMP USED AT DIRECTION JUDGE 
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free 
that 
to leave at all 
I also thin 
• 
k that we've kind of glossed over 
it was said a couple of times. While that's not 
it does open it up a 
; saying that at least 
Mr. -
THE COURT: 
— or Officer 01 
the house getting th 
wasn' t doing 
MS. 
THE 
that." 
DUNROE: 
COURT: 
You've only got two 
consensual. I think 
-28-
the fact 
critical, 
little bit here when we have an officer 
a couple of times. 
Reading from your own memo, the f. Lrst time 
sen says, "Your friends said you were in 
e drugs," he said — Mr. Merworth 
That's right. 
And then the second time, he just 
cops. You've got five men. Ever 
said, "I 
shrugged. 
ything's 
. a reasonable person would have felt free 
to leave right up until Mr. Merworth incriminated himself. 
Your motion's deniec 
on this case' 
MS. 
THE 
MS. 
THE 
THE 
THE 
MS. 
MR. 
p 
DUNROE: 
COURT: 
DUNROE: 
COURT: 
CLERK: 
COURT: 
DUNROE: 
I. Do we have another hearing set 
No, we don't. 
Okay, do you want a pretrial? 
Yes, please. 
Okay. 
January 17th, 9 o'clock, 9:00 a.m. 
Okay, thank you. 
Thank you. 
FERBRACHE: Thank you, your Honor. 
(Hearing concluded) 
already 
